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INTRODUCTION
Permanency lies at the heart of child-protection policy.' The Adoption
and Safe Families Act (ASFA) directs that children in foster care who can-
not be reunified with their birth families be adopted or, as a second choice,
placed in one of a few narrow categories such as guardianship.2 Unpacking
permanency, however, reveals that the legal concept is based on rigid cate-
gories and flawed normative concepts of family, rather than on empirical
* Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B.,
Harvard College. I would like to thank the Michigan State Law Review for hosting this excel-
lent symposium, and Shannon Smith for her careful editing. Sasha Coupet, Marsha Garrison,
and Sarah Katz gave helpful comments, and Laura Solecki, Melissa Martin, and Amanda
Aievoli provided valuable research assistance.
I. This reflects research findings that attachment to caring adults is correlated with
stronger social-emotional development, health, and educational attainment in children and
adolescents. Richard P. Barth & Laura K. Chintapalli, Permanence and Impermanence for
Youth in Out-of-Home Care, in ACHIEVING PERMANENCE FOR OLDER CHILDREN & YOUTH IN
FOSTER CARE 88, 88 (Benjamin Kerman, Madelyn Freundlich & Anthony N. Maluccio eds.,
2009) [hereinafter ACHIEVING PERMANENCE].
2. 42 U.S.C. §675(5)(C) (2006).
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data.' This narrow conception of permanency undercuts the reality of chil-
dren's and parents' experiences. It also ignores the modem psychological
understanding of permanency as "an enduring relationship that arises out of
feelings of belongingness.' Under the latter definition, studies show that
there is no difference between children being adopted and those being cared
for by a guardian.5
The law has been slow to adapt, as evidenced by the ongoing funding
prioritization of adoption and the preference for adoption, particularly
closed adoption, over subsidized guardianship in state and federal law.6 The
permanency framework tries to fit complex relationships and families into
neat and tidy boxes. This approach is neither effective nor desirable, deny-
ing many children meaningful relationships with caring adults and devalu-
ing certain kinds of families.
I focus on permanency for two reasons. First, an outline of the current
permanency framework's flaws is necessary to rethinking the current inef-
fective approach to child protection. Second, the permanency framework
illustrates how the differential treatment of parties in private and public
family law results in significant inequalities between them.7 Inequality in
3. Psychiatrist Dr. Robert S. Marvin, for instance, observes that "developmental
and clinical psychologists [researching children in the child-protection system] are struck by
how little of [the psychological research and] knowledge has been transferred to the legal
profession." Robert S. Marvin, Quality of Permanence-Lasting or Binding? Legal Status v.
Relationships, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 535, 537 (2005); see also Gretta Cushing & Ben-
jamin Kerman, Permanence Is a State of Security and Attachment, in ACHIEVING
PERMANENCE, supra note 1, at 109, 110 (observing that "most research and legislation" fo-
cuses on legal categories such as adoption, rather than on broader, psychological conceptions
of permanency).
4. Psychologist Mark Testa puts forth this definition. Mark F. Testa, The Quality of
Permanence-Lasting or Binding? Subsidized Guardianship and Kinship Foster Care As
Alternatives to Adoption, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 499, 499 (2005). Other experts recom-
mend similar ones. See, e.g., Patricia O'Brien, Carol Rippey Massat & James P. Gleeson,
Upping the Ante: Relative Caregivers' Perceptions of Changes in Child Welfare Policies, 80
CHILD. WELFARE 719, 744 (2001) (defining permanency as "warm and enduring relation-
ships" between children and their caregivers); Introduction, ACHIEVING PERMANENCE, supra
note 1, at 2 (detailing Casey Family Services' definition as "an enduring family relationship
that is safe and meant to last a lifetime, offers the legal right and social status of full family
membership, provides for physical, emotional, social, cognitive, and spiritual well-being,
[and] assures lifelong connections to extended family, siblings, and other significant adults,
along with family history and traditions, race, ethnicity, culture, religion, and language").
These conceptions starkly contrast with the purely legalistic view of permanency underlying
ASFA framework. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006).
5. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (outlining Mark Testa's research).
6. Testa notes that historically the psychological definition was more predominant,
but that ASFA and related child-protection policies have shifted the conception of permanen-
cy to one of a "legally enforceable" commitment, i.e. adoption. Testa, supra note 4, at 499.
7. Cf Sarah Katz, The Value of Permanency: State Implementation of Legal
Guardianship Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV.
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the treatment of families is the subject of this symposium. One significant,
yet understudied, area of inequality is the public and private family law sys-
tems. Private family law focuses on the private distribution of wealth and
applies primarily to middle- and upper-class families. Public family law
concerns state public benefits systems and thus generally applies to lower-
income people.8 Which system families enter, which "door" they come
through, often has a significant impact on their custodial and other parental
rights.9 One reason for this is the rigid and narrow conception of permanen-
cy.
Part I of this Essay outlines the system's definition of permanency and
gives a snapshot of children in the child-protection system. Part II explains
how this definition is flawed, both starkly different from the reality of chil-
dren's experiences and fundamentally misguided as policy. Part 111 recom-
mends some concrete changes to address these flaws.
I. THE PERMANENCY FRAMEWORK
A. The Legal Framework
Permanency is the central value underlying the child-protection sys-
tem. Hence, agencies engage in permanency planning with families, both
birth and adoptive; courts hold "permanency hearings"; and every child in
foster care has a permanency goal. 0 When it was enacted in 1996, the
ASFA emphasized permanency as a reaction to the problem of "foster care
drift."" Thousands of children stayed in foster care for years, virtually their
1079 (noting that different standards apply to determine where children live; whereas the
"best interests of the child" standard governs private family law, permanency is the main
value in public family law).
8. For a critical discussion of these inequities, see generally Cynthia Godsoe, Pars-
ing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113 (2013); Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood
Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299
(2002). There is also significant racial disproportionality in the child-protection system. For
instance, whereas Black children make up 13.9% of the general population, they comprise
26% of the children in foster care. See Race and Hispanic Origin Composition: Percentage
of U.S. Children Ages 0-17 by Race and Hispanic Origin, 1980-2012 and Projected 2013-
2050, CHILDSTATS.GOV,
http://www.childstats.gov/americaschildrentables/pop3.asp?popup=true (last visited Dec.
18, 2013).
9. See Godsoe, supra note 8, at 116.
10. For a full discussion of ASFA framework, see Godsoe, supra note 8, at 122-23.
11. H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 12 (1997). One dictionary definition of permanent is
"not expected to change for an indefinite time; not temporary." English Dictionary Definition
of "Permanent," COLLINS ENG. DICTIONARY,
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/permanent (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
Foster care is designed to be inherently temporary, although average lengths of stay show
that for many children it is not. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
1115
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whole childhoods, without being returned to their parents or freed for adop-
tion via a termination or surrender of parental rights. To facilitate perma-
nency, the statute mandates terminations in many more cases and requires
termination when a child has spent fifteen of the past twenty-two months in
foster care. 2 It also permits concurrent planning, so that agencies can work
simultaneously to reunify a child with her birth parents and for her to be
adopted. 3 Finally, ASFA requires that each child in foster care have a per-
manency goal, to be recommended by the agency and set by the court. 4
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) defines perma-
nency as "a legal, permanent family living arrangement, that is, reunifica-
tion with the birth family, living with relatives, guardianship, or adoption."' 5
Towards this end, ASFA specifies five possible permanency outcomes or
goals, in order of preference:
I. Return to the Parent
2. Adoption
3. Legal Guardianship
4. Permanent Placement with a Fit and Willing Relative
5. Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (APPLA).' 6
HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2012 ESTIMATES AS OF NOVEMBER
2013, at 2 (2013), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/defaultfiles/cb/afcarsreport2O.pdf (reporting 2012 data).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006). ASFA also excuses states from aiding families to
reunify in certain cases and prioritizes adoptions, bringing numerous new measures and
funding sources to promote them. Id. §§ 671, 673, 675. Funding consists both of subsidies to
adoptive families and incentive payments to states that increased adoptions from foster care.
13. Id. § 675(1)(B). Administrative law literature calls into question whether concur-
rent planning towards two such different aims is possible. See Cynthia Godsoe, Just Inter-
vention: Differential Response in Child Protection, 21 J.L. & POL' y 73 (2012).
14. 42 U.S.C. §675(5)(C).
15. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON ADOPTION AND OTHER PERMANENCY OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER
CARE: FOCUS ON OLDER CHILDREN 2 (2005) [hereinafter HHS REPORT] (emphasis omitted),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/cb/congress adopt.pdf. Children are to
be raised in as family-like a setting as possible, rather than institutional care. This policy
reflects the better results children have in family-like settings, such as foster care, than in
congregate care such as group homes. Id. at 3.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C). "Depending on the age and needs of the child, other
permanent living arrangements can include long-term foster care, residential care, and inde-
pendent living." CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, COURT HEARINGS FOR THE PERMANENT
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 4 n.13 (2012), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwidelaws-policies/statutes/planning.pdf; see also
DONALD N. DUQUETrE & MARK HARDIN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADOPTION 2002: THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE: GUIDELINES
FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN,
(1999) (detailing the permanency hierarchy under ASFA).
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Reunification must be ruled out before a child can have adoption as a
permanency goal. 7 Adoption must be ruled out before a child can have a
permanency goal of three or four. 8 Finally, goal number five can only be
assigned to a child with the documentation of a compelling reason. 9 A
child's goal is very significant, directing not only the long term plan for
him, but also influencing the type of foster family, caseworker, and other
services the child and his family will receive.2" Accordingly, there should be
a strong correlation between a child's placement, e.g. pre-adoptive foster
home, and a child's goal, e.g. adoption.
Further narrowing the permanency framework is the culture of case-
workers.2' Caseworkers are trained to treat adoption as the "gold standard,"
far superior to other permanency arrangements.22 Positing adoption as a
panacea for all children in foster care, many caseworkers continue to un-
17. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 16. ("In those cases where
reunification is not appropriate, adoption is viewed as providing the greatest degree of per-
manence.... Such options [as guardianship with relatives] do not provide the same level of
permanency available through adoption .. "). Reunification remains the most common goal
and outcome for children in care. See infra Table I (noting that, in 2012, reunification was
the goal for 53% of children in care).
18. DUQUETTE & HARDIN, supra note 16, at 11-2, -4; see also Leslie Cohen, How Do
We Choose Among Permanency Options? The Adoption Rule Out and Lessons from Illinois,
in CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, USING SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES FOR
CHILDREN 19, 20 (Mary Bissell & Jennifer L. Miller eds., 2004), available at
http://www.aecf.org/upload/PublicationFiles/CW3622H5063.pdf (noting that, in Illinois,
"there has been a 'rebuttable presumption' that a child should be adopted. As a matter of law,
this means that one must prove to the court that adoption is not appropriate for a child and
must defend any decision to pursue another permanency goal").
19. Two important types of APPLAs are (1) permanent placements with specific
non-related foster families and (2) long-range placements in group or institutional settings,
with special assurances of permanency and stability. See HHS REPORT, supra note 15, at 2,
10; HORNBY ZELLER Assocs., OFFICE JOB & FAMILY SERVS., OHIO CHILDREN IN PLANNED
PERMANENT LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: TRENDS AND OUTCOMES 1 (2007) [hereinafter OHIO
REPORT], available at http://jfs.ohio.gov/ocf/PPLAReportJune2007-final.pdf.
20. See, e.g., PERMANENCY THROUGH TEAMWORK, ILL. DEP'T CHILD. & FAM. SERVS.
(2002), available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/docs/fpChapter3.pdf (outlining the different
type of potential foster parent roles and responsibilities vis-t-vis different permanency
goals).
21. Legislators also over-prioritized adoption during the enactment of ASFA. See,
e.g., 143 CONG. REC. 26,402 (1997) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("Children need to know
that they have permanency, which means successful, healthy reunification with their birth
families or permanency in an adoptive home.").
22. Godsoe, supra note 8, at 143-44. Reflecting this bias towards adoption, states
have cited "demystifying" other permanency options such as subsidized guardianship as a
prerequisite to expanding permanency options. See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND ET AL., MAKING
IT WORK: USING THE GUARDIANSHIP ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (GAP) TO CLOSE THE
PERMANENCY GAP FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 19 (2012), available at
http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/making-it-work-
using-the.pdf.
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derutilize subsidized guardianship and other permanency options. They act
as "gatekeepers" to various permanency options and frequently do not sug-
gest guardianship to caregivers or children when it may be the most appro-
priate option.23 Sometimes, they even pressure kinship caregivers to either
adopt kids, which is impossible for some, or give them up.24
Funding streams also significantly impact state permanency goals."
The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of
2008 (FCA), Congress's largest child protection reform since ASFA, did
not change the permanency goal structure per se.26 It did, however, revamp
some of the federal funding for foster care and adoption, which will likely
alter the usage of different permanency goals. Specifically, the FCA allows
federal IV-E funding for subsidized kinship guardianship.1 Previously, this
funding had only been available for foster care and adoption, so states had
incentives to prefer adoption over guardianship. 28 Some states had subsi-
23. ANNA ROCKHILL ET AL., CHILD WELFARE PARTNERSHIP, OREGON'S TITLE IV-E
WAIVER DEMONSTRATION PROJECT EVALUATION 2004-2009: SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP
COMPONENT 10 (2009) [hereinafter Oregon Report]; see also CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS: SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP:
CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATIONS, at iii (2011), available at
http:l/www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/subsidizedO.pdf (finding that workers "ex-
pressed reluctance to offer [subsidized guardianship] due to deep-seated professional beliefs
regarding the preferability of adoption").
24. OREGON REPORT, supra note 23, at 75; Kendra Hurley, Preserving Family Ties,
15 CHILD. WELFARE WATCH 8, 11-13 (2008); see also MaryLee Allen & Beth Davis-Pratt,
The Impact of ASFA on Family Connections for Children, in INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A
LOOK BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 70,74 (2009) [hereinafter INTENTIONS
& RESULTS], available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001351 safe familiesact.pdf (noting the inconsistent
application of ASFA in California and also finding that the prioritization of adoption led
caseworkers to pressure caregivers to adopt or risk losing custody of, and contact with, chil-
dren in their care).
25. ASFA and related laws, such as the Adoption Promotion Act of 2003, have
consistently prioritized funding for adoption over reunification or other exit placements from
foster care, such as guardianship. For instance, in FY 2012, a conservative estimate shows
that the federal government allocated $4.29 billion for foster care, $2.54 billion for adoption
assistance, and only $80 million for kinship guardianship. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM.,
FEDERAL FUNDING RESOURCES FOR CHILD WELFARE (2012), available at
http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/financingfunding.pdf.
26. See Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
27. Adoption is still funded more robustly than any other permanency outcome, and
the FCA recently expanded the Adoption Incentive Funding Program. See Madelyn
Freundlich, Permanence for Older Children and Youth: Law, Policy, and Research, in
ACHIEVING PERMANENCE, supra note I, at 127, 136-37.
28. The FCA also prioritizes other kinds of kin arrangements and provides funds for
states to expand their searches for foster children's families. § 102, 122 Stat. 3949. These
measures also increase the desirability of a permanency goal of three or four.
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dized guardianship systems, but the majority of states did not.29 Despite the
FCA reforms, the permanency structure remains narrow due to restrictive
state definitions of kin for subsidized guardianship, the adoption rule-out,
funding, and caseworker culture.
The FCA does not mandate any definition of kin for subsidized guard-
ianship funding, instead letting states define it.30 Many view kinship as a
broad and flexible category.3 Reflecting this, some states have chosen
broad definitions of kinship, expanding their definition of "relative" beyond
persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, to include persons who
have a significant relationship with a child.32 Many states, however, have
kept their definitions of relative narrow.33 For instance, Idaho limits its defi-
nition to certain blood or legal relatives: "An individual having a relation-
ship with a child by blood, marriage or adoption. Such individuals include
grandparents, siblings and extended family members such as aunts, uncles
and cousins. '
29. New York and Michigan both implemented subsidized guardianship programs
only after the passage of the FCA. See 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws 473-83 (McKinney) (amending
the New York Social Services law and the New York Family Court Act to create the "Kin-
ship Guardianship Assistance Program" (KinGAP)); Subsidized Guardianship Assistance
Act of 2008, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 722.871-.881 (2013). Illinois provides an example of a
state subsidized guardianship program that predated the FCA. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405 / 2-27 (West Supp. 2013) (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
30. The FCA does, however, require that the kinship resource be a certified foster
parent. States have cited this requirement as a significant impediment to guardianship for
numerous children. See infra note 124.
31. Carol Stack's work on this topic is perhaps the best known. See CAROL B.
STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY (1974) (describing
kinship networks of "those you count on," which may not distinguish between blood rela-
tives, friends, and neighbors).
32. This latter category is often referred to as "fictive kin." States with broader
definitions include: Alaska, California (federal approval pending), Colorado, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Washington (only for Native American children), and Wisconsin. CHILDREN'S
DEF. FUND ET AL., supra note 22, at 7. A number of these, such as the District of Columbia,
expanded their definitions to benefit from federal funding allowed under the FCA. Id.
33. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-501(A)(13) (2013) ("'Relative' means a
grandparent, great grandparent, brother or sister of whole or half blood, aunt, uncle or first
cousin.").
34. IDAHO DEP'T HEALTH & WELFARE, STANDARD FOR GUARDIANSHIP ASSISTANCE 2
(2011), available at
http://www.healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Portals/0/Children/AdoptionFoster/GuardianshipAss
istance.pdf; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-501(A)(13); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.872(h).
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B. The Child-Protection Population
The most recent child-protection data show that ASFA has in part
achieved its goals, but only in part. The overall number of children in foster
care has declined considerably since ASFA was enacted.35 About a quarter
of children in foster care, however, still have permanency goals other than
reunification or adoption.36 This leaves thousands of children in long-term
foster care, many of whom "age out" of the system at age eighteen or twen-
ty-one with no legal or emotional connection to an adult.37 This is com-
pounded by the large disconnect between children with goals of adoption
and the number of pre-adoptive placements. Twenty-four percent of chil-
dren had adoption as their goal in 2012,38 but only 4% were in pre-adoptive
homes." Finally, subsidized guardianship is vastly underutilized as a per-
manency option. For instance, 4% of children in foster care had subsidized
guardianship as their goal, far fewer than the 24% with an adoption goal,
and even fewer than those having the admittedly undesirable goals of long-
term foster care (5%) or emancipation (5%).' ° Further reflecting this un-
derutilization, only 7% of children exiting foster care in 2012 went to guard-
ianships, less than those who were legally emancipated (10%) or aged out of
care with no legal ties to anyone.4
35. For instance, in the last seven years, the foster care population has dropped from
513,000 children to 399,546. See infra Table 1.
36. This discussion is based on the most up-to-date data available, comprised of
estimates for 2012. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 8. This data is outlined in the tables
below.
37. For instance, ASFA has significantly enlarged the gap between children who
want to be adopted and those who are, creating thousands of "legal orphans." See Freundlich,
supra note 27, at 136-37 (reporting that between FY 1998 and FY 2003, the percentage of
children aged nine and older waiting to be adopted increased from 39% to 49% while those
who were adopted remained at 33%, and that during the same period, 37% of children nine
or older whose parents' rights were terminated had a permanency plan for emancipation or
long-term foster care).
38. See infra Table I.
39. See infra Table 2.
40. See infra Table i; see also OREGON REPORT, supra note 23, at 9-10 (finding that
subsidized guardianship is underutilized). Emancipation is a particularly undesirable perma-
nency goal. Tellingly, an HHS report on permanency does not include emancipation in its
"definition of permanency because it does not provide for a legal permanent family for the
child (although the child may have a long-term emotional connection with a family)." HHS
REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
41. See infra Table 3.
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Table 1: Number of Children in Foster Care by Year; Case Goals
of the Children in Foster Care by Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total
Children in 513,000 510,000 491,000 463,000 423,773 408,425 400,540 399,546
Foster Care
Reunify with
Parent(s) or 262,706 248,054 235,655 226,867 202,065 202,389 199,123 205,033
Principal (51%) (49%) (48%) (49%) (49%) (51%) (52%) (53%)
Caretaker(s)
Live with 21,722 20,359 19,058 16,922 14,763 14,092 13,420 13,149OtherRelative(s) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (3%) (3%)
100,949 117,380 118,867 111,225 102,615 96,772 94,629 93,165Adoption (20%) (23%) (24%) (24%) (25%) (25%) (25%) (24%)
Long Term 37,628 43,773 40,871 37,522 32,361 24,697 22,744 20,095
Foster Care
(APPLA) (7%) (9%) (8%) (8%) (8%) (6%) (6%) (5%)
Emancipation 31,938 30,662 31,906 29,556 26,547 24,131 20,635 20,251
(APPLA) (6%) (6%) (6%) (6%) (6%) (6%) (5%) (5%)
Guardianship 15,653 20,945 21,447 18,266 15,990 14,574 14,593 14,829
(3%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%)
CasePlan 42,403 28,827 23,197 22,642 16,280 18,102 19,324 18,614
Goal Not Yet
Established (8%) (6%) (5%) (5%) (4%) (5%) (5%) (5%)
Table 2: Number of Children in Foster Care by Year; Placement
Settings of the Children in Foster Care by Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total
Children in 513,000 510,000 491,000 463,000 423,773 408,425 400,540 399,546
Foster Care
Pre-Adoptive 18,691 17,351 19,007 17,485 17,280 14,886 14,213 14,253
Home (4%) (3%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%) (4%)
Foster Family 124,153 124,571 123,760 112,643 101,688 103,943 107,995 109,619Home(Relative) (24%) (24%) (25%) (24%) (24%) (26%) (27%) (28%)
Foster Family 236,775 236,911 225,138 217,243 200,179 194,900 188,222 185,257
Home (Non-
Relative) (46%) (46%) (46%) (47%) (48%) (48%) (47%) (47%)
43,440 33,433 32,066 29,122 25,302 25,066 23,624 23,776Group Home (8%) (7%) (7%) (6%) (6%) (6%) (6%) (6%)
Institution 51,210 53,042 48,167 47,165 40,502 36,607 34,656 34,253
n (10%) (10%) (10%) (10%) (10%) (9%) (9%) (9%)
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Supervised 5,918 5,872 5,468 5,217 4,690 4,050 3,868 4,073
Independent (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) %) ) (1%) %) ) (1%)
Living
10,930 12,213 10,769 9,766 8,047 6,563 5,870 4,973Runaway (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (1%) (I %)
Trial Home 21,883 26,606 26,624 24,358 23,010 21,340 20,568 22,010
Visit (4%) (5%) (5%) (5%) (5%) (5%) (5%) (6%)
Table 3: Number of Children Exiting Foster Care by Year; Reasons for
Discharge
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Children
Exiting 287,000 289,000 293,000 285,000 276,266 254,114 245,260 241,254
Foster Care
Reunification
with Parent(s) 155,608 154,103 153,868 148,340 140,061 128,913 125,908 122,401
or Primary (54%) (53%) (53%) (52%) (51%) (51%) (52%) (51%)
Caretaker(s)
Living with 31,362 30,751 27,720 23,944 21,424 20,423 20,076 19,671OtherRelative(s) (11%) (11%) (9%) (8%) (8%) (8%) (8%) (8%)
51,323 50,379 52,235 54,284 55,684 52,340 49,866 51,229Adoption (18%) (17%) (18%) (19%) (20%) (21%) (20%) (21%)
Emancipation 24,407 26,517 29,730 29,516 29,471 27,854 26,286 23,439(9%) (9%) (10%) (10%) (11%) (11%) (11%) (10%)
G dihi 12,881 15,010 18,158 19,941 19,290 16,208 15,707 16,424
uaransp (4%) (5%) (6%) (7%) (7%) (6%) (6%) (7%)
Transfer to 6,440 6,683 6,118 5,195 6,291 5,114 4,560 4,256AnotherAgenr (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (2%)
4,445 5,049 4,697 2,324 2,141 1,504 1,387 1,216Runaway (2%) (2%) (2%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%)
534 509 473 456 417 338 343 328(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
If. THE FRAMEWORK'S FLAWS
The failure of ASFA to achieve permanency for more children is in
large part due to flaws in the existing permanency framework. I will focus
here on three flaws in particular-the conflation of legal permanency with
psychological permanency; the framework's rigidity, particularly in contrast
to the private family law system; and the narrow definition of permanency.
These flaws perpetuate inequality for many children in the child-protection
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system by denying their relationships familial status, with all of the finan-
cial and societal benefits that this status brings.
A. Conflation of Legal and Psychological Permanency
ASFA permanency framework outlined above assumes that only legal-
ly permanent relationships can lead to psychological permanency (or best
lead to it). This rubric is backward. Rather than beginning with legal per-
manency, and reasoning from that about the needs and wishes of children,
the legal system should derive permanency options from the psychological
data about child-family relationships and then construct legal protections
from these relationships.
This problem is in part due to ASFA's reliance on idealized notions of
family and adoption, rather than data about psychological permanency and
attachments for children in foster care.4" As Professor Sacha Coupet puts it:
"child welfare policy ... continues to laud adoption as the singularly ideal
'happy ending' in the sad tale of foster care."43 That is not to say that ASFA
has it all wrong-there is certainly ample evidence to support the legislative
findings that long-term foster care is not beneficial to children and that
healthy development requires a meaningful attachment to an adult.' ASFA,
however, is based upon an outdated and flawed concept of appropriate
adults to whom children can be attached.4" Two bodies of recent research-
on children and youth's perceptions of permanence in various living ar-
rangements and on failed adoptions-demonstrate that this rubric likely
underestimates the permanency of subsidized guardianship and some other
relationships, while overestimating the permanency of adoption.
Recent studies by Mark Testa, Madelyn Freundlich, and others show
that guardianship can bring the same feelings of permanence as adoption to
42. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty,
Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1189-91 (1999); Sacha Coupet, Swim-
ming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making the Case for "Impermanence, " 34
CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 410 (2005) (describing the "nuclear family ideal" underlying the child-
protection system). Another reason for the default to legal permanency is its easier measura-
bility. The number of adoptions can be counted, but more nuanced permanency attachments,
such as children living with another relative, require more qualitative assessment.
43. Coupet, supra note 42, at 405.
44. As to the first point, every major study on the subject has concluded that chil-
dren have worse outcomes on every scale-education, employment, criminal justice in-
volvement-from being in foster care than similarly situated children left home. See Joseph
J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster Care,
97 AM. EcON. REV. t583, 1583 (2007); Catherine R. Lawrence, Elizabeth A. Carlson &
Byron Egeland, The Impact of Foster Care on Development, 18 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
57, 68-72 (2006). As for the second, see Cushing & Kerman, supra note 3, at 110-13 (outlin-
ing psychological attachment theory).
45. See Godsoe, supra note 8, at 121-29.
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children formerly in foster care.46 Dr. Testa sought to measure psychological
permanency, defined as "an enduring relationship that arises out of feelings
of belongingness. ' '47 To this end, he questioned children and their caregivers
and compared them to a control group. Testa found that legal permanence,
i.e. adoption, did not improve outcomes for children as compared to subsi-
dized guardianship.48 There were no significant differences between the two
groups of children in terms of intent, belongingness, and continuity.49
Testa's findings indicate that we should not automatically equate legal per-
manence with psychological permanence or assume that higher levels of the
former result in higher levels of the latter °
Freundlich and others' interviews of former foster youth from New
York City revealed similar patterns.5" About 43% of the former foster youth
were assigned an APPLA goal; 27% had reunification; 10% placement with
or adoption by a relative; and 20% did not know if they had a goal or what it
was.12 The study found that youth with an APPLA placement often fail to
receive the services that would enable them to successfully age out of foster
care and that there is not an attempt to develop "family-based permanency
plans" for these youth. 3 Significant gaps in the current legalistic permanen-
cy model include its lack of focus on youth's "emotional security"' and its
failure to account for siblings, although being with siblings is "a critical
component" for many youth.5 ASFA permanency structure ignores these
46. Madelyn Freundlich et al., Permanency Options and Goals: Considering Multi-
faceted Definitions, 35 CHILD. YOUTH CARE F. 355 (2006).
47. Testa, supra note 4, at 499. This article came out of his evaluation of the largest
subsidized guardianship program in the country, Illinois.
48. Id. at 528.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 533 (noting that the study's findings "suggest that legal status may be less
important for lasting family relationships than extra-legal factors, such as kinship and prior
time spent together").
51. Freundlich et al., supra note 46, at 356 (recommending that "long-term security
and stability" should underlie permanency, which is possible in a broader range of relation-
ships than adoption and guardianship).
52. Id. at 365.
53. Id. at 357, 365.
54. Lauren Frey et al., Achieving Permanency for Youth in Foster Care: Assessing
and Strengthening Emotional Security, 13 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 218, 218-19 (2008)
(documenting this failure and noting its impact on long-term outcomes for former foster
youth).
55. Id.; see also Mark E. Courtney, Outcomes for Older Youth Exiting the Foster
Care System in the United States, in ACHIEVING PERMANENCE, supra note i, at 40, 52 (re-
porting study results that 88% of former foster youth with a sibling visited him or her at least
once after being discharged from foster care). In contrast, subsidized guardianship has been
praised for keeping siblings together. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S DE. FUND ET AL., supra note 22,
at 8.
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realities by assuming that children and families feel more psychological
permanency the more the arrangement is granted legal permanency.
This conflation results in a system that is both over and under inclu-
sive. Just as psychological permanency is devalued, legal permanency is
overvalued. Broken and failed adoptions do occur, particularly adoptions
from the foster care system, and this risk increases with the age of the child
at adoption.56 Exact numbers of failed adoptions are very hard to come by,
largely because agencies do not track them well and often do not track them
at all once the adoption is finalized. Adoptions disrupt, i.e. the placement
fails before the adoption is legally finalized, at estimated rates of 10% to
25%. 5' Adoptions dissolve or fail after they are finalized at estimated rates
of 3% to 15%.58 Attorneys and others working in the child-protection sys-
tem confirm that broken adoptions are not uncommon, although the real
scope of the problem is unknown.59 Some studies have concluded that adop-
tion failure rates are comparable to those of subsidized guardianships where
the subsidy rates are the same.6 In sum, it is not clear that adoption is more
permanent in this most basic sense than guardianships.
Broken adoptions are devastating to the children and youth involved,
sometimes all the more so because the permanency of adoption has been so
widely touted.6' As one youth who was adopted twice out of foster care
56. Ruth G. McRoy & Elissa Madden, Youth Permanence Through Adoption, in
ACHIEVING PERMANENCE, supra note 1, at 244, 254-55.
57. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ADOPTION DISRUPTION AND DISSOLUTION 2
(2012), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s-disrup.pdf.
58. Id. at 6; see also Susan Scarf Merrell, Adoption's Dirty Secret, DAILY BEAST,
(Apr. 17, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/04/17/adoptions-dirty-
secret.html. Both of these numbers are likely underestimates as name changes and other
correlations to adoption make tracking dissolutions very difficult.
59. See, e.g., Dawn J. Post & Brian Zimmerman, The Revolving Doors of Family
Court: Confronting Broken Adoptions, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 437 (2012) (documenting this
problem in the New York City child-protection system and noting the agency's failure to
track failed adoptions from the foster care system).
60. See Testa, supra note 4, at 528-30 (reporting low disruption rates for children in
subsidized kinship guardianships); CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND ET AL., supra note 22, at 10 (dis-
cussing the number of children benefitting from guardianship assistance programs through-
out the nation).
61. See, e.g., Meribah Knight, Failed Adoptions Create More Homeless Youths,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.conV20!1 / 12/30/us/failed-adoptions-create-
more-homeless-youths.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx= 1388351272-
Z6NoaxDcOM9lu41EzialfA (telling the story of one youth who was devastated when his
adoptive mother of twelve years abandoned him at age seventeen, shortly before the end of
the subsidy for his care). Research demonstrates that this is not an isolated case. See
MADELYN FREUNDLICH & JANA BOCKSTEIN, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 86 (2008), available at
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/06/permanent solutionsseeking-family-stabilityforyouth injfoster
_care.pdf (reporting that some adoptive parents she interviewed saw their role in a child's
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said: "Kind of weird. It's not that permanent. I didn't even know that could
happen [that it could end]."62 This reality has led many youth to be, rightly,
skeptical of adoption as a "cure-all." One young woman in foster care ex-
plained:
I didn't wanna be adopted because I knew that [it] wouldn't benefit me .... I defi-
nitely wanted the relationship. [But] to me being adopted doesn't necessarily mean
you're gonna have a good relationship. . . . It's just a paper that says you belong to
someone .... [W]hat's on paper isn't what's important to me.63
B. Rigid Construction of the Family
A second, and related, flaw of the current permanency framework is
that its rigidity does not reflect actual family attachments and structures.
The current framework follows a strict hierarchy, demonstrated by the adop-
tion rule-out, which compels all or nothing choices. Once reunification
within ASFA time lines is ruled out, children in foster care are meant to
sever all ties with the biological family and be adopted into an entirely new
family. 6' This does not account for the reality of most foster children's at-
tachments to multiple adults.65 It also ignores the traditional caregiving pat-
terns of certain racial or cultural groups, particularly Native American and
African-American families. 66
This framework prioritizes the parent-child dyad over other kinship
connections, ignoring the nuance of family relationships.67 The number of
children in kinship care has increased dramatically in recent years; as of
life not as "lifelong," but rather as lasting only until the child became a legal adult, and
perhaps not coincidentally until the adoption subsidy ceased, at age eighteen or twenty-one).
62. See OREGON REPORT, supra note 23, at 96.
63. GINA MIRANDA SAMUELS, A REASON, A SEASON, OR A LIFETIME: RELATIONAL
PERMANENCE AMONG YOUNG ADULTS WITH FOSTER CARE BACKGROUNDS 48 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/old-reports/415.pdf.
64. Annette Appell has termed this flawed assumption the "separation myth," i.e.,
the false belief that children can be totally emotionally separated from their parents, even
when they are living with or adopted by others. Annette Ruth Appell, The Myth of Separa-
tion, 6 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 291 (2011). This myth of separation contributes to the flawed
permanency framework I am discussing.
65. See Godsoe, supra note 8, at 130-31.
66. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Achieving Permanency for American Indian and
Alaska Native Children: Lessons from Tribal Traditions, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 239, 281-85
(2008) (outlining the preference among many tribes for extended family caregiving, guardi-
anship, and open adoption over a termination of parental rights and closed adoption frame-
works). This structure compounds the problematic racial disproportionality in the system.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
67. As Coupet points out, "[k]inship caregivers, unlike non-kin adoptive parents, are
already related in meani.igf-:' ways." Coupet, supra note 42, at 411.
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2011, over a quarter of foster children were living in kinship care.6" Studies
show that children in kinship placements fare better on many counts than
children in non-kin foster care. For instance, children in kinship care are
more likely to report that they like the adults with whom they live-93% vs.
79% in non-kin foster care and 51% in congregate or group care. 69 They
were also more likely to report wanting their current placement to be their
permanent home-61 % vs. 27% in non-kin foster care and 2% in congre-
gate care. Children in kinship care have fewer behavioral problems than
children in non-kinship care and are less likely to run away from their foster
care placements.7 ° Yet kin caregivers continue to be urged to adopt, even if
another arrangement, such as guardianship, would be a better, and equally
permanent, fit for them and the children for whom they are caring.7' This
focus on adoption sometimes "'scare[s] away"' children's extended families
who could be valuable permanency resources.72
The framework's rigidity also impedes the development of creative
ways for children to reach permanency, particularly for the mostly older
children in APPLA placements. Illustrating this, Freundlich's study found
that most of the youth said they would have preferred more permanency
options beyond adoption, reunification, or APPLA.73 Child-protection pro-
fessionals also felt constrained by the limited range of options.74 One pro-
fessional told researchers: "'We always reduce things to these formulas and
put families with real lives and real situations into boxes. There's got to be a
68. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS
REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2011 ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2012, at 1 (2012), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport 19.pdf (reporting 2011 data).
69. TIFFANY CONWAY & RUTLEDGE Q. HUTSON, CTR. LAW & SOC. POLICY, IS
KINSHIP CARE GOOD FOR KIDS?, at 1 (2007), available at
http:/www.clasp.orgladmin/site/publications/files/0347.pdf (outlining research). The data is
somewhat mixed, likely due to the greater levels of poverty and poor health among kinship
caregivers. See, e.g., Aron Shlonsky, A Fine Balancing Act: Kinship Care, Subsidized
Guardianship, and Outcomes, in ACHIEVING PERMANENCE, supra note i, at 176, 177, 182-83
(outlining some of the drawbacks, in addition to the benefits, of kinship foster care). Children
in kinship care also have lower reunification rates with their parents than children in other
types of foster care, but this might be based upon kin caregivers' greater willingness to allow
non-custodial parents ongoing contact with children in their care. See Barth & Chintapalli,
supra note 1, at 91-92.
70. Id. at 1-2 (noting that 6% of children in foster care run away from home, com-
pared to 16% in non-kin foster care and 35% in group care). Other benefits of kinship care
include greater stability and less stigma than stranger foster care placements. See Testa,
supra note 4, at 505, 530.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24; see also O'Brien, Massat & Gleeson,
supra note 4, at 723.
72. Freundlich et al., supra note 46, at 368; see also OREGON REPORT, supra note
23, at 10.
73. Freundlich et al., supra note 46, at 365.
74. Id. at 367.
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broader set of solutions here .... [Caseworkers] try to micromanage every-
thing according to some formula or cookie cutter or whatever."' 75
Finally, the more nuanced division of the parental bundle of sticks in
private law stands in stark contrast to ASFA all-or-nothing framework, fur-
ther compounding inequities between families. In the private law system,
joint custody or shared parenting is the preference in numerous jurisdic-
tions.76 Other authority supports this more flexible framework. The ALl
Principles of Family Dissolution, for instance, outline categories of non-
biological parents, including de facto parents and parents by estoppel.77 This
renders possible a system where a biological parent is not a legal parent, but
nonetheless has parental rights and responsibilities.
C. Narrow Conception of Permanency
ASFA framework's inflexibility, coupled with false assumptions about
the needs and desires of adolescents, has resulted in a system that fails to
find any permanency for significant groups of young people.78 The myopic
focus on adoption ignores the many children who do not want to be or will
not be adopted.79 This is particularly so for older children in foster care.8°
And there are many. Thirty thousand children a year exit the system with no
legal ties to any family, about five times as many youth as are adopted.8
These children have very poor outcomes as adults across every parameter.82
75. Id.
76. See Godsoe, supra note 8, at 120 (citing examples); see also ELEANOR E.
MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
CUSTODY 112-13 (1992) (reporting increasing patterns of joint custody in California in the
first major study of joint custody).
77. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.04 (2002).
78. See, e.g., Susan Vivian Mangold, Extending Non-Exclusive Parenting and the
Right to Protection for Older Foster Children: Creating Third Options in Permanency Plan-
ning, 48 BUF. L. REV. 835, 859-62 (2000) (noting that ASFA "is not targeted to assist older
children in foster care" and critiquing the 1999 Foster Care Independence Act for funding
only "independent living" skills programming rather than "family supports" for older chil-
dren who will age out of care).
79. See Godsoe, supra note 8, at 132, 133 n.1 10 (outlining the reasons why older
children, sibling groups, and children with special needs are particularly unlikely to be
adopted).
80. See Fred Wulczyn, Foster Youth in Context, in ACHIEVING PERMANENCE, supra
note 1, at 13, 22-23 ("For children generally, [the likelihood of] adoption rates fall as the age
[of] admission [to foster care] rises."); id. at 27 (analyzing national data and reporting that
39% of children who exit foster care between ages sixteen and eighteen exit to
"nonpermanen [cy]").
81. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 8, at 3, 5 (showing 23,439 exiting due to eman-
cipation and 5,226 teenagers adopted); CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 68, at 3, 5 (showing
26,286 exiting due to emancipation and 5,152 teenagers adopted); CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2010
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Several assumptions about older children in foster care have contrib-
uted to this crisis. First, many workers, and to some degree the system as a
whole, assume that these children are unadoptable. For instance, some
workers cite the child's age alone as a compelling reason for not terminating
parental rights, and thus freeing the child for adoption." Yet many of these
youth want to be adopted, and are adoptable.' Although there have been
recent campaigns to encourage more adoptions of adolescents, much work
remains to be done.85
Equally important, youth in foster care who do not want to be or will
not be adopted still want and need permanency connections.86 Indeed, ex-
perts have suggested that permanency may have a different meaning de-
pending upon the age of the child.87 In order to thrive, all young people,
whether they will be adopted or age out of foster care, need a permanent
lifelong connection to a caring adult. These youth want such connections,
even if they do not come as part of a cohabitating family unit. As one youth
explained:
A lot of people have this misconception like, "Oh, they're too old, they're gonna
age out, they don't really need [permanency]" and stuff like that. Although most
ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2011, at 4, 7 (2011), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreportl8.pdf (showing 27,854 exiting due
to emancipation and 5,452 teenagers adopted in 2010).
82. For instance, they are much more likely to have poor outcomes, such as drop-
ping out of high school, becoming pregnant before the age of twenty-one, and being arrested,
incarcerated, homeless, and unemployed. See supra note 44. These poor outcomes impose
large costs on society. See IRA CUTLER, COST AVOIDANCE: BOLSTERING THE ECONOMIC CASE
FOR INVESTING IN YOUTH AGING OUT OF FOSTER CARE 1 (2009), available at
http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/cost-avoidance-bolstering-economic-case-investing-youth-
aging-out-foster-care-0 (estimating the cost of outcome differences of the aging out popula-
tion to be nearly $5.7 billion annually).
83. See KRISTI CHARLES & JENNIFER NELSON, PERMANENCY PLANNING: CREATING
LIFE LONG CONNECTIONS 14-15 (2000), available at http://www.nrcyd.ou.edu/publication-
db/documents/permanecy-planning.pdf (decrying this practice).
84. Freundlich et a]., supra note 46, at 365, 367-68; CHARLES & NELSON, supra note
83, at 8 (noting that "youth have told us again and again that being an adolescent doesn't
mean they don't want to be adopted or find a permanent family connection").
85. For examples of such campaigns, see e.g. Mary Boo, Successful Older Child
Adoption: Lessons from the Field, ADOPTALK, Summer 2010, available at
http://www.nacac.org/adoptalk/OlderChAdoptions.html.
86. Outcomes are better for youth who aged out of foster care when they retained a
relationship with their birth parents whose rights had been terminated. CHARLES & NELSON,
supra note 83, at 11-12 (citing studies).
87. Shirley A. Dobbin, Facilitation of Systems Reform: Learning from Model Court
Jurisdictions, in ACHIEVING PERMANENCE, supra note 1, at 210, 217 ("Taken-for-granted
concepts such as 'permanence' and 'well-being' have not been adequately operationalized,
especially with respect to how they may differ for different populations of children.").
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[youth] [in foster care] say they don't want it, ask [them] when they get older, [and
they say] "You know, I wish I had somebody for me."88
The child-protection system has focused on "independent[]" living skills for
this group of children, ignoring the facts that we are all interdependent and
that young people without relationships with a caring adult are particularly
at risk for problems.8 9
These realities, coupled with the number of youth in foster care who
will not be adopted, make the current treatment of Another Planned Perma-
nent Living Arrangement (APPLA) placements very problematic. APPLA is
treated largely as a purgatory or "dumping ground" for youth to bide their
time until they age out of foster care, unprepared for adult life and lacking a
meaningful connection to an adult.' Yet this population is quite significant
in many states.9 In Ohio, for instance, almost one-third of children who are
not going to be reunified have a goal of APPLA.92 A significant portion of
these children, 36%, are thirteen years old or younger.93 Very few children
with this goal are adopted. Tellingly, in 2011, not one child in an APPLA
placement was adopted.94
88. Freundlich et al., supra note 46, at 365.
89. Afterword: Making Families Permanent and Cases Closed-Concluding
Thoughts and Recommendations, in ACHIEVING PERMANENCE, supra note 1, at 357 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also DUQUE-'TE & HARDIN, supra note 16, at 11-15 (recom-
mending that APPLA be designated as the goal for children in very limited circumstances to
avoid it being overused).
90. Making connections even more difficult is the fact that 15% of children in foster
care, including a large proportion of older youth, live in congregate or group care. See
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 8, at I.
91. To help reduce this number, there are currently efforts being undertaken to limit
the use of APPLA. See Amy Taylor, Older Youth in Foster Care: Challenges and Opportu-
nities, CHILD. WELFARE LEGIS. POL'Y NEWSL. (Dec. 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-wel fare-legislative-policy-newsletter-
decem.aspx. For instance, Ohio permits APPLA placements only after a clear and convincing
finding that it is in a child's best interest. Id. New York state mandates that case plans for
children in APPLA placements must include an adult who is a "significant connection and
permanent resource." Id.
92. OHIO REPORT, supra note 19, at 1, 3. This has led consultants to advise the Ohio
agency that "APPLA [should be] a 'living arrangement that is truly planned and perma-
nent,"' not a "catch all for whatever temporary plan is needed." Id. at 1.
93. Id. at 6. An additional concern arises from children placed in APPLA only be-
cause of their age. Id. at 2. Although Ohio law requires that children in APPLA be sixteen or
older, be "counseled on the permanent placement options available," and be "unwilling to
accept or unable to adapt to a permanent placement," experts are skeptical that the group in
APPLA has always been appropriately counseled and that the finding of inadaptability is
truly made as a last resort. Id. About one-quarter of kids in APPLA age out of foster care
each year. Id. at 10. Twenty-three percent of kids have a case goal of returning home, but
only a little over 5% actually do so. Id. No children in APPLA were adopted the year of the
report. Id.
94. Id.
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I. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
This section proposes changes to the permanency framework. I do not
here outline a wholesale reform, but rather make some modest suggestions
within the current paradigm.95 These suggestions, and examples of promis-
ing recent programs, can lead to greater equality and permanency for the
wide range of children and young people in foster care.
A. Inform Policy with the Real Experiences of Children and Families
An effective permanency framework must take into account the reali-
ties of children's experiences. This requires using research about what per-
manency means to children in foster care to influence legal definitions ra-
ther than the reverse. Incorporating the real-world experiences of youth in
care would entail involving youth themselves in the entire process-
something most jurisdictions still fail to do.96 Only by talking to the youth
themselves can workers and judges learn which relationships youth value
and need.97
There are numerous ways this simple step could improve the current
system. I consider a few examples. First, definitions of kin for subsidized
guardianship funding could be expanded. As noted above, the federal FCA
does not limit this definition and yet numerous states have adopted inflexi-
ble definitions of blood or other relatives.98 Expanding the definition, par-
ticularly to include fictive kin, would both reflect the reality of children's
and families' connections and maximize federal funding for the permanent
outcome of subsidized guardianship. Hawaii provides a valuable illustration
of such a definition, recognizing numerous categories of adults including:
"[a] member of the child's extended family," fictive kin in the form of
"[t]he child's godparents," "[a] person to whom the child, child's parents,
and family ascribe a family relationship," or the traditional cultural category
of "'hanai relative.' '99
95. Comprehensive change would require completely rethinking ASFA and much of
the child-protection system. To take one small data point, child-protection professionals have
repeatedly noted that ASFA's strict timelines impede permanency for numerous children
whose families and relationships are more complex. See Freundlich et al., supra note 46, at
369. Although thoroughly rethinking ASFA framework is an important project, this Article
has more modest, and more politically realistic, aims.
96. Points of involvement for young people include permanency goal setting and
court hearings, to name just a few.
97. This would have the additional beneficial effect of increasing both youth and
family autonomy by allowing them to define their own structures. It would also incorporate a
wider range of cultural and ethnic traditions.
98. See supra Section I.A.
99. HAW. GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM POLICY MANUAL, § 5.2.3 TITLE IV-E
KINSHIP GUARDIANSHIP ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITY, available al
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Another way in which the permanency framework could incorporate
real-life experiences is to allow youth to balance their old and new family
connections, such as through open adoption." Enabling youth to maintain
connections to a wide range of people, including birth parents, former foster
parents, siblings, and other relatives, increases the number of youths willing
to be adopted and reflects the reality of many family structures.'' These
more nuanced family arrangements are increasingly used both in private
family law and in tribal law." Open adoption is now the most common
form of adoption in the private system. °3 Flexible adoption arrangements in
other areas of family law, which allow for ongoing contact with birth par-
ents or families, are also commonly used in Native communities, even for
children coming out of foster care."" Tribal adoption usually does not entail
terminating parental rights, instead permitting the sharing of parental rights
based on the best interests of the child and on a "recognition of where the
child's sense of family is."'0 5 In addition to allowing for more permanency
options, and thus greater support for children, open adoption also allows for
http://www.nrcpfc.org/fostering-connections/state-gap/Hawaii%205.2.3-Permanency-Assis
tance.pdf. A hanai relative is defined as:
an adult, other than a blood relative, whom the court or department has found by
credible evidence to perform or to have performed a substantial role in the upbring-
ing or material support of a child, as attested to by the written or oral designation
of the child or of another person, including other relatives of the child.
Id. § 5.2.3(B)(3).
100. See FREUNDLICH & BOCKSTEIN, supra note 61, at 20.
101. All the research to date has found that children adopted in open adoptions have
better psychosocial outcomes than those adopted in semi-open or closed adoptions. See Re-
search About the Impact of Openness on Adoptees, INDEP. ADOPTION CENTER,
http://www.adoptionhelp.org/open-adoption/research (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). Of particu-
lar significance is a California study that included only children adopted from foster care and
reported that "[a]ll of the adoptive parents saw openness as helping their child deal with
identity issues, and none felt that openness exacerbated the issues of adolescence." Id. The
adoptive parents reported that even "contact with birthparents who had mental health or
substance abuse" issues benefitted the adopted children. Id.
102. A potential critique of flexibility is that the more discretion there is in decision
making, the more likely it is that bias may enter the system. See DOROTHY ROBERTS,
SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 55 (2002); Godsoe, supra note 8, at 134.
103. Mara Lemos Stein, One Baby, Two Moms: A Rise in Open Adoptions, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 14, 2012, 6:46 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10000872396390444184704577587150909159234
(noting that "the vast majority of [U.S.] adoptions are now open" and citing a 2012 study
reporting that open adoptions have increased from 36% of adoptions in the late 1980s, to
79% in 1999, to 95% in 2012).
104. See, e.g., CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 366.24 (West Supp. 2013) (defining
tribal custody adoption as an "adoption by and through the tribal custom, traditions, or law of
an Indian child's tribe. Termination of parental rights is not required to effect tribal custom-
ary adoption"); see also Atwood, supra note 66, at 284-85 (discussing Salish and Kootenai
tribal statutes allowing a tribal court to grant "residual parental rights" during a termination).
105. Atwood, supra note 66, at 287.
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the preservation of cultural traditions." Despite past calls for more open
adoption, the child-protection system continues to prioritize traditional
closed adoptions."7 A few jurisdictions are, however, exploring open adop-
tion and other arrangements to increase permanency for youth in foster
care. 10
8
B. Focus on Permanency Relationships-a Person Not a Place
A related change would be a conception of permanency focused on
connections, in all of their myriad forms, rather than on rigid boxes of
placement categories."° This shift in view would both reflect real experi-
ences and incorporate a psychological view of permanency."0 Recent stud-
ies into children's conceptions of permanency have shown that "'learned
attachment and familiarity"' are more important than legal status or even
than biological relationships."' In a sense, I am recommending that we re-
verse the direction of policy. Instead of moving from legal to psychological
permanency, assuming that the former implies the presence of the latter,
legal definitions of permanency should be informed to the maximum extent
possible by children's actual attachments.
One very promising area for incorporation of this truth is in planning
for children in APPLA and/or with a permanency goal of independent liv-
ing. An important shift is to focus on permanency in terms of people rather
than places, since we know a significant number of children will not be
adopted or placed in guardianships."' Efforts should be made to establish a
106. See id. at 268-69; see also In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 359-66
(Minn. 1994) (reversing an adoption of three Chippewa children by a white couple and find-
ing that the children's permanency could be met in foster care with an Indian couple, and not
only through adoption, as the connection to the tribe was important). It is important to note
that this decision predated ASFA.
107. For instance, shortly after ASFA's enactment, Susan Mangold called for more
"non-exclusive parenting" arrangements for children exiting foster care, including open
adoption. Mangold, supra note 78, at 836-39.
108. See Alice Bussiere, Permanence for Older Foster Youth, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 231,
238-39 (2006).
109. See, e.g., Freundlich et al., supra note 46, at 368 (calling for an individualized
and broad definition of permanency that focuses on "creating and/or maintaining emotional
connections with family and others").
110. See Cushing & Kerman, supra note 3, at I10 (noting that the focus on legal
categories such as adoption and guardianship "obscures the importance of nurturing parental
connections that are critically important for youth development, irrespective of whether the
relationships are formally recognized with legal sanction").
Ill. Marvin, supra note 3, at 536 (discussing Testa's research). Marvin also points
out that attachment theory supports these conclusions. Id.
112. This effort should be made in conjunction with efforts to teach adolescents in
foster care independent living skills, as they need both permanency connections and adult-
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meaningful relationship with at least one adult for these children." 3 Ways to
accomplish this include linking young people with mentors and other adults
who, while perhaps not custodial resources, can help former foster youth
become successful adults. 14 These adults could be former foster parents,
other relatives, teachers, sports coaches, or even birth parents whose legal
rights have been terminated or who cannot be custodial resources."'
There is growing recognition of the need for a shift in this regard. For
instance, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges passed
a 2011 resolution stating that "No child should exit foster care without a
life-long connection to a caring and responsible adult."'" 16 States are also
trying to better prepare children in APPLA placements for life as successful
adults. For instance, Michigan requires that youth in its APPLA-E program
have an "established relationship with at least one significant supportive
adult," regardless of what type of placement they are in."7 Similarly, New
hood skills to flourish. See Afterword: Making Families Permanent and Cases Closed-
Concluding Thoughts and Recommendations, supra note 89, at 360-61.
113. See Frey et al., supra note 54, at 221 (recommending that youth who are unable
to be adopted or placed in guardianships may instead achieve permanence through "a non-
legal commitment to be [a] family for a lifetime"). Many older youths are placed in congre-
gate care, rather than in foster family homes. Young people in congregate care have even
fewer opportunities to connect with caregiving adults than do those in foster family homes.
See Courtney, supra note 55, at 41, 42 (noting that "a large percentage of [older youth in
foster care] live in congregate care settings that are generally staffed by relatively young shift
workers" who turn over frequently and are not charged with focusing on facilitating family
or other relationships for youths).
114. Freundlich et al., supra note 46, at 358; see also Mangold, supra note 78, at 875-
76 (recommending a federally subsidized mentoring system for youth aging out of foster
care). Some youth are finding mentors on their own, but these relationships lack any legal
recognition or other support from the child-protection system. See Cushing & Kerman, supra
note 3, at 115.
115. Many youth who age out of foster care to "independent living," or even those
who are adopted or in guardianships, continue to be in contact with their biological parents
and sometimes even live with them, regardless of the parents' legal status. See Godsoe, supra
note 8, at 131-33 (outlining data); see also Courtney, supra note 55, at 41-42 (reporting
national data showing that 47% of youth aging out of foster care returned to their biological
families upon discharge from state care). In recognition of this fact, and due to the many
youth who age out of foster care as legal orphans, numerous states have recently enacted
statutes allowing for the reinstatement of parental rights in certain circumstances. See
Godsoe, supra note 8, at 148-5 1.
116. NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, KEY PRINCIPLES FOR
PERMANENCY PLANNING FOR CHILDREN 1 (2011), available at
http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/keyprinciples.final-.permplanning.pdf.
117. NICOLE HOSHOCK, LEAH HIGGINS & JUSTIN WROBEL, APPLA AND APPLA-E:
DISTINCTIONS AND DILEMMAS 8 (2012), available at
http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/0fficesPrograms/CWS/ChildWelfareServicesTrai
ning/CWS Training Materials/Tab4_CWS_112712_APPLAAPPLA-E.pdf. "The goal [of
this requirement] is to prepare the youth to leave foster care and become a self-supporting
adult with documented supportive adult(s) to assist and provide guidance." MICH. DEP'T OF
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York City recently prioritized the goal of ensuring that youth who age out of
foster care have "permanent connections with caring adults." ' 8
C. Build in Greater Flexibility
The third related reform is to build greater flexibility into the perma-
nency definitions and system as a whole." 9 This would give more options to
families and workers in order to ensure best outcomes for all children in
foster care. 2° Within the existing system, potential changes include broad-
ening definitions of kin, as discussed above, and accommodating the unique
needs of kin caregivers in the foster care licensing process. Broadly defined
foster care licensing standards allow agencies the requisite flexibility to
achieve results-oriented care and case-by-case decisions to, for instance,
prioritize kinship care.' 21
My final recommendation is the elimination of the adoption rule-
out.122 The rule-out impedes permanency for numerous youth, particularly
older youth whose consent is required for adoption and children with kin-
ship caregivers who cannot or will not adopt.'23 Although adoption is a very
valuable permanency outcome, it should not be the only one. Adoption can
still be prioritized through funding and other means. It should not, however,
be deemed preferable to guardianship in all circumstances, particularly as
the permanency outcomes have been demonstrated to be the same.
HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN'S FosTER CARE MANUAL 18 (2012), available at
www.mfia.state.mi.us/olmweb/ex/fom/722-7.pdf.
118. N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN'S SERVS., PREPARING YOUTH FOR ADULTHOOD 1
(2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/htm/acs/downloads/pdf/youth-for adulthood.pdf.
This policy is based on the recognition that "none of us lives independently of our networks
of family [and] friends" and that the historic lack of these connections for aging out youth
has led to very bad outcomes. Id. at 5.
119. For instance, as previously noted, permanency may best be defined differently
for different age groups. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
120. See Marvin, supra note 3, at 544 (decrying the "one-size-fits-all" decisions
which predominate in the child-protection system).
121. See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND ET AL., supra note 22, at 16 (noting rigid licensing
standards as a barrier to success in implementing subsidized guardianship programs and
discussing states that have overcome this by, for instance, allowing variances or waivers of
certain standards for kin caregivers).
122. 1 do not mean to suggest that subsidized guardianship is the solution for all
foster children, any more than adoption is. Subsidized guardianship itself brings costs to
family reunification. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 7, at 11-12. Building more flexibility into the
system, however, would recognize that there are numerous routes to permanency.
123. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text; see also Testa, supra note 4, at
530 (cautioning "against taking too hard a line in enforcing [the] adoption rule-out"). Testa
does, however, recommend that the adoption rule-out remain robustly enforced for children
with non-kinship caregivers. Testa, supra note 4, at 531. 1 have doubts about this recommen-
dation.
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CONCLUSION
The concept of the family is currently in considerable flux. Family re-
lationships of all types are being redefined, sometimes by legislatures and
courts and sometimes by families themselves. 24 The child-protection sys-
tem's definition of permanence between adults and children should similar-
ly be re-thought. A more nuanced definition of permanency would reflect
the truth that no relationship is perpetually legally binding or "forever,"
while also recognizing the diverse and complex relationships children and
young people experience. By expanding those family structures granted
legal recognition and support, a broader definition would ensure more chil-
dren are connected to safe, loving adults-to real permanency.
124. This has most notably taken place with regards to marriage. See, e.g., United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (declaring DOMA unconstitutional and
giving legally married same-sex couples the same recognition as opposite-sex married cou-
ples under federal law); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (holding that
proponents of Proposition 8 do not have standing to defend the constitutionality of a state
statute limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples).
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